Pittsburgh University School of Law

Scholarship@PITT LAW
Book Chapters

Faculty Publications

2017

Introduction to Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions
Anthony C. Infanti
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, infanti@pitt.edu

Bridget J. Crawford
Pace University School of Law, bcrawford@law.pace.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_book-chapters
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Indian and
Aboriginal Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Law and Philosophy
Commons, Law and Race Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legislation Commons, Public Law and
Legal Theory Commons, Sexuality and the Law Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, Taxation-State
and Local Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions,
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_book-chapters/2

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship@PITT
LAW. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@PITT
LAW. For more information, please contact leers@pitt.edu, shephard@pitt.edu.

Posted with permissions.

FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS

BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD & ANTHONY C. INFANTI, EDS.

DRAFT WORKING PAPER DATED APRIL 10, 2017

Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions

Could a feminist perspective change the shape of the tax law? Most people understand that
feminist reasoning has tremendous potential to affect, for example, the law of employment
discrimination, sexual harassment, and reproductive rights. Few people may be aware, however,
that feminist analysis can likewise transform tax law (as well as other statutory or code-based
areas of the law). By highlighting the importance of perspective, background, and
preconceptions on the reading and interpretation of statutes, Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax
Opinions shows what a difference feminist analysis can make to statutory interpretation. This
volume, part of the Feminist Judgments Series, brings together a group of scholars and lawyers
to rewrite tax decisions in which a feminist emphasis would have changed the outcome or the
court’s reasoning. The volume includes cases that implicate gender on their face (like medical
expense deductions for fertility treatment or gender confirmation surgery as well as special tax
benefits for married individuals), as well as cases that require a more nuanced understanding of
history, politics and economics (such as the tax treatment of tribal lands and the business expense
deduction). This book opens the way for a discussion of how viewpoint is a key factor in
statutory interpretation.

Bridget J. Crawford is a Professor of Law at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace
University.
Anthony C. Infanti is a Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
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Preface
Could a feminist perspective change the shape of the tax law? To begin to answer this
question, we brought together a group of scholars and lawyers to rewrite, using feminist
perspectives, significant tax cases from the United States Tax Court, federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. Some of them implicate gender on their face—
questions about the deductibility of fertility expenses or the use of gender in actuarial tables, for
example—but others implicate gender less obviously, such as a case involving the ability of state
and local governments to tax Indian land, or the ability of a businessman to take a deduction for
the repayment of certain debts. This book challenges the belief that statutes are neutral. Most
people understand that feminist reasoning has tremendous potential to affect, for example, the
law of employment discrimination, sexual harassment, and reproductive rights. Few people may
be aware, however, that feminist analysis can likewise transform tax law (as well as other
statutory or code-based areas of the law). By highlighting the importance of perspective,
background, and preconceptions on the reading and interpretation of statutes, Feminist
Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions shows what a difference feminist analysis can make to
statutory interpretation.
This volume, like all of the books in Cambridge University Press’s Feminist Judgments
Series, demonstrates that judges with feminist viewpoints could have changed the law, based on
the precedent and law in effect at the time of the original decision. Or, even if the desired result
could not be achieved under the current law, this volume shows how a powerful dissent can
serve to draw attention to the fact that the tax law operates in many cases to the disadvantage of
women, racial minorities, LGBT taxpayers, and other historically subordinated groups. Together,
the opinions and commentaries in this volume illustrate the importance of diversity of
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perspectives on the bench so that judges do not approach their work with a uniform worldview
influenced by the same set of preconceptions and privileges. For judges, lawyers, students, and
members of the general public, reading these critical opinions helps to expose the ways in which
judges—and, in turn, the development of the law—are subtly influenced by preconceptions,
existing power hierarchies, prevailing social norms, and “conventional” wisdom. This book
argues that the tax law is not neutral, but rather shaped by the society that produces and applies
it. At the same time, this book holds out the hope that the tax system can be reformed to be an
instrument of greater justice and equality for all people.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to the Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions Project
Bridget J. Crawford and Anthony C. Infanti

How would judicial opinions change if the judges used feminist methods and
perspectives when deciding cases? That is a question that various groups of scholars, working
around the globe and mostly independently of each other, have taken up in a series of books of
“shadow opinions”—literally rewritten judicial decisions—using precedents, authorities,
theories, and approaches that were in existence at the time of the original decision to reach
radically different outcomes and often using saliently different reasoning. This global sociolegal
movement toward critical opinion writing originated when a group of lawyers and law professors
who called themselves the Women’s Court of Canada published a series of six decisions in 2008
in the Canadian Journal of Women and the Law. Inspired by that project, scholars have produced
similar projects in the United Kingdom,1 Australia,2 the United States3 and Ireland.4 Other
projects well under way involve New Zealand law5 and international law.6 Nascent projects are
under consideration in India and Scotland as well.

1

See FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Rosemary Hunter et al. eds., 2010).

2

See AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW (Heather Douglas et al. eds., 2015).

3

See FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Kathryn M. Stanchi,

Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016).
4

See NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: JUDGES’ TROUBLES AND THE GENDERED POLITICS OF IDENTITY

(Máiréad Enright et al. eds., 2017).
5

See New Research Project to Look at New Zealand Judgments from a New Angle, ADLS (Oct. 16, 2015),

http://www.adls.org.nz/for-the-profession/news-and-opinion/2015/10/16/new-research-project-to-look-at-newzealand-judgments-from-a-new-angle/ (describing FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT AOTEAROA).
6

See Feminist International Judgments Project: Women’s Voices in International Law, U. LEICESTER,

http://www2.le.ac.uk/institution/researchimages/feminist-international-judgments-project-women2019s-voices-in-

What all of these projects have in common is that they involve rewriting judicial opinions
that, up until this point, have mostly, if not entirely, been grounded in questions of constitutional
interpretation. The Women’s Court of Canada, for example, focused their attention on section 15
(the equality clause) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (for a discussion of section
15 in this volume, see Kathleen Lahey’s contribution in Chapter 2). The U.S. project, Feminist
Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court, examined twenty-five key
cases on gender ranging from 1873 to 2015, most of which involved the interpretation of
constitutional rights.
This book approaches the question posed at the start of this chapter from a different
perspective; that is, it concerns the rewriting of judicial opinions in an area of law that is largely
governed by statute and in which constitutional arguments play a relatively small role. This book
thus takes the sociolegal movement of critical opinion writing in a new, hitherto uncharted
direction. The book is also—and quite appropriately in view of the tax system’s key and
keystone role in society—the first in a series of U.S.-based Feminist Judgments books to be
published by Cambridge University Press. Future volumes in the series are expected to take up
other areas of law and a variety of state and federal court decisions organized around different
subject matters.
The Appeal of Critical Opinion Writing
Critical opinion writing, as a form of scholarship, has tremendous appeal to us—and
given the number of completed, ongoing, and nascent projects around the world, it obviously
appeals to others in different countries and across a variety of areas of law, too. But why? For us,

international-law (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (describing FEMINIST INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS (Troy Lavers &
Loveday Hodson eds., forthcoming)).

2

critical opinion writing is appealing because it represents a multidimensional and iterative
challenge to preconceived notions about law’s subjects and objects as well as about how law is
created and interpreted and how it develops. Critical opinion writing challenges not only the law
and the legal system to open its vistas but also represents particular challenges to those who write
and rewrite judicial opinions and to those who read and consume those opinions.
Critical opinion writing challenges the rewriter—professors and practitioners who are
mostly accustomed to analyzing, applying, and critiquing judicial opinions rather than writing
them from the ground up—by forcing the critic/consumer to place herself in the shoes of the
judge/opinion writer. With views colored by the path that history has taken since the original
opinion was written but confined to sources available at the time the original opinion was
drafted, the rewriter finds that she must wrestle with and resolve the issues and conundrums that
judges routinely face. Thought must be given to achieving a just result in the case at hand while
taking a broader view of how the case fits into the general framework and structures of the law
so as not to prematurely stymie future legal development or foreclose it altogether. This move of
placing the critic/consumer of judicial opinions into the role of the judge provides the opinion
rewriter with a new lens for viewing and interpreting judicial opinions when she returns to her
life as a critic/consumer of judicial opinions. This experience should provide the rewriter with a
new appreciation for the difficulty of crafting good judicial opinions and increase her empathy
for the role played by judges.
At the same time, critical opinion writing challenges judges themselves by highlighting
the contingent nature of the opinions that they write and their role in the process of making law.
Imagining an alternative path for the law—whether by directly displacing the majority opinion in
a case or by laying the groundwork for taking a different path in the future through an imagined
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concurring or dissenting opinion—challenges the aura of neutrality and objectivity conveyed by
the tone that judges generally use when writing their opinions, as well as the notion that it is not
so much the person as the judicial office pronouncing judgment. The rewritten opinions thus
pointedly show that, however nostalgic the analogy, deciding cases is about much more than
being a baseball umpire who simply calls balls and strikes, as some have contended. 7 Through
the act of producing work in the form of a judicial opinion (rather than the more typical law
review article or essay critiquing an opinion), the opinion rewriter demonstrates that judges
possess no monopoly on articulating what the law ought to be, much less on purporting to
correctly interpret the law or to set the law on a path toward furthering the cause of justice and
the flourishing of society. The commentaries provided alongside the rewritten opinions
underscore this challenge by explaining just how the rewritten opinions differ from the original
and by imagining what a different path for sociolegal history might have looked like. Taken
together, the opinions and commentaries in this volume also help to make the case for ensuring
that there is a diversity of backgrounds on the bench so that judges do not approach their work
with a uniform worldview influenced by the same set of preconceptions and privilegings and can
thus helpfully challenge and question each other’s perspectives.
For those who read these rewritten opinions (and we hope that some sitting judges will be
among the readers of this volume), critical opinion writing may help to expose the ways in which
judges—and, in turn, the development of the law—are subtly influenced by preconceptions,
endemic privilegings and power hierarchies, and prevailing social norms and “conventional”
wisdom. Especially when compared with the original opinions, the rewritten opinions concretely
demonstrate how opening oneself to different and differing viewpoints that bring to the surface

7

Bob Egelko, Roberts Deftly Evades Attempts to Pin Him Down, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 15, 2006, at A4.

4

and call into question how underlying subjective experiences and perspectives can influence the
current interpretation and application of the law—as well as its future development—in ways
that benefit society as a whole. Naturally, the commentaries included with each rewritten opinion
in this volume facilitate this process, but, in the end, there is no substitute for comparing the
original and rewritten opinions side by side and examining them for yourself. Whether you are a
student of tax law, a practitioner, a judge, or merely an interested taxpayer, actively engaging in
this process of questioning judicial decision making can help to sensitize readers of judicial
decisions to the multiple (and sometimes insidious) influences on any decision maker. For those
judges among our readers, this process can go far toward ensuring that these influences do not
inappropriately creep into their own opinion writing.
Goals of the Project
This volume, Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions, is unique primarily for two
reasons. First, its focus is on an area of law that most people do not associate with feminism or
gender equality. Second, as mentioned earlier, this volume focuses on an area of law that is
largely controlled by statutes and in which constitutional arguments typically play a relatively
small role. But just as the volume that gave rise to this series, Feminist Judgments: Rewritten
Opinions of the United States Supreme Court, showed how feminist analysis can transform
decisions of the nation’s highest court, so, too does this volume show how feminist analysis can
transform tax law (as well as other statutory or code-based areas of the law) by highlighting the
importance of perspective, background, and preconceptions on the reading and interpretation of
statutes. As William Eskridge argued in Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, with the passage of
time, the perspective of anyone interpreting a law “diverges from that of the statute as a result of
changed circumstances which give rise to unanticipated problems, developments in law and the
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statute’s evolution, and different political and ideological frameworks.”8 In Eskridge’s view,
statutes are just as much subject to interpretation as the common law and the Constitution are—
and understanding this fact is crucial to understanding how the modern regulatory state operates.9
This book of rewritten tax opinions similarly stands on the foundational belief that statutes are
susceptible to multiple interpretations, and who is doing the interpreting matters greatly.
Within the scholarly tax community, there historically has been great resistance to
bringing noneconomic “perspectives” to bear in the analysis or interpretation of tax law (whether
those perspectives are based on critical race theory, feminism, queer theory, or other “outsider”
approaches to the law). Instead, “mainstream” scholars have traditionally viewed tax law as
closely aligned with the “science” of economics. From this perspective, the core questions
addressed by tax law cut across all lines of difference in society—save those of income or, for
those working in the transfer tax area, wealth—and are thus unaffected by concerns relating to
race, ethnicity, gender and gender identity/expression, sexual orientation, socioeconomic class,
immigration status, and disability. For this reason, “mainstream” tax scholars resist the notion
that these “social” concerns play any part in our “neutral” tax laws and greet the critical tax
scholars who raise these concerns through work that draws attention to the differential or
discriminatory impact of tax laws on traditionally subordinated groups either with hostility or,
more commonly, a cold shoulder.
For scholars and laypeople alike, tax is considered to be an arcane and technical subject,
but all can agree that taxes have a direct impact on the pocketbook. Taxes impact each of us in
terms of how much of our salary we take home from work each pay period, how much we pay

8

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 11 (1994).

9

Id. at 1–2.

6

for items at the grocery store, how much it costs us to purchase and own a home (due to the
deductibility of home mortgage interest and property taxes and transfer taxes levied at the time
of purchase or sale), and how much it costs us to transfer the property that we accumulate during
our lives to family and friends either by gift or inheritance, just to name a few examples. It is
thus unsurprising that tax is often seen as linked more closely with economics than law. In
keeping with this view, the dominant mode of analyzing tax law focuses on people as little more
than the sum of their financial transactions. That is, “mainstream” tax analysis homogenizes
taxpayers so that all lines of difference (save those of income or wealth) are fully erased or
ignored. Obviously, this thinking leaves no room to conceive of the possibility of a feminist tax
judgment. But what the dominant mode of analysis ignores—and what this volume highlights—
is the fact that tax statutes are rarely determinative on their own. Approaching the critical tax
project from a different vantage point, this volume shows that the context in which parties and
courts operate influences the understanding, interpretation, and application of statutes.
Methodology
When Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court was
still in its editing phase, we recognized the potential for extending that book’s methodology to
our area of shared expertise—taxation. Our plans for this book began when we assembled a list
of eight tax cases culled from our own knowledge and scholarship. We were interested in cases
that implicated gender on their face (such as those involving medical expense deductions for
certain fertility-related expenditures or gender confirmation surgery) as well as cases that require
an understanding of the way that tax issues function in different historical, political, and
economic settings (such as the state taxation of land set aside for American Indians). In
composing our initial list cases that might be ripe for feminist rewriting, we did not limit cases to
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any particular court or jurisdiction, mostly because very few tax cases make it all the way to the
Supreme Court and also because decisions issued by the U.S. Tax Court and other lower courts
play a large role in the development and practice of tax law.
In order to benefit from the input of colleagues with different areas of tax expertise, we
assembled a diverse and distinguished group of a dozen leading tax scholars as our Advisory
Panel to help evaluate the cases on our list as especially deserving (or not) of feminist rewriting
and to suggest other cases. This Advisory Panel consists of Alice G. Abreu, Patricia A. Cain,
Joseph M. Dodge, Mary Louise Fellows, Wendy C. Gerzog, Steve R. Johnson, Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Ajay K. Mehrotra, Beverly I. Moran, Richard L. Schmalbeck, Nancy Staudt, and
Lawrence A. Zelenak. We received much valuable feedback from the Advisory Panel and
expanded the list of potential cases to twenty-four. We then issued a public call for authors,
allowing prospective authors to indicate their preferences for rewriting an opinion or writing a
commentary on any of the cases on the list of twenty-four. Prospective authors were further
invited to suggest cases that were not on our list, too.
With the goal of choosing the most qualified and diverse authors, and taking into account
the input of our Advisory Panel, we narrowed our selection to eleven cases. Eight of the cases
came from the list of twenty-four; three were suggested by the intended authors. Most of the
contributors to this volume are tax specialists (whether academics or practitioners), but some
have nationally recognized expertise in a substantive specialty that underlies the tax law focus of
the chosen case. We are proud that our contributors represent a range of expertise and
experience. The authors include nationally recognized senior tax experts, well-known feminist
scholars, specialists in other substantive areas of the law, junior scholars, a law dean, a practicing
attorney, and colleagues whose primary teaching work occurs in the clinical setting. We sought
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diversity of gender, sexual orientation, race, perspective, expertise, and status in the academy,
consistent with an active commitment to a volume that would represent many viewpoints and
voices. In addition, we have included a chapter written by Canadian feminist tax scholar
Kathleen Lahey immediately following this introduction in order to provide an important
comparative/international context for the rewritten opinions in this volume.
What Is a Feminist Judgment Anyway?
In our call for participation, we explicitly stated that we, as volume editors, conceive of
feminism as a broad movement concerned with justice and equality, and that we welcomed
proposals to rewrite cases in a way that brings into focus issues such as gender, race, ethnicity,
socioeconomic class, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, and immigration status. In
keeping with the stance taken in the compilation and editing of Feminist Judgments: Rewritten
Opinions of the United States Supreme Court,10 we did not instruct authors on what we believed
to be a “feminist” interpretation of the cases or confine them to any certain method or process for
completing their work. From our perspective, this book is squarely within the tradition of critical
tax theory, scholarship that we have described as sharing one or more of the following goals:
“(1) to uncover bias in the tax laws; (2) to explore and expose how the tax laws both reflect and
construct social meaning; and (3) to educate nontax scholars and lawyers about the
interconnectedness of taxation, social justice, and progressive political movements.”11 To be
sure, feminism has been historically motivated by concern for equality for women, but the most
effective and inclusive feminism takes into account the way that many intersecting identities can

10

Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 3,

at 3.
11

Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, at xxi

(Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2009).

9

make the quest for justice more complex and elusive, given the structure of both the law itself as
well as the meaning of equal protection as interpreted by twenty-first-century courts. We did and
do welcome a diversity of viewpoints about feminism’s goals and practices and how they
manifest themselves in judicial opinions.
Guidelines for Opinions and Commentary
The purpose of Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions is to show (not describe)
how certain tax cases could have been decided differently if the judges had brought to bear a
more gender-sensitive viewpoint. Authors were free to draw on their own understandings and
interpretations of feminist theories and methods, but they were limited to rewriting their opinions
based on the law and facts in existence at the time of the original decision. This is a key feature
of all of the books in the Feminist Judgments Series. One of the underlying claims of this
particular volume is that statutory interpretation, like decisions on constitutional questions, is
affected by judicial experiences, perspectives, and reasoning processes. Opinion authors were
free to rewrite the majority opinion, or add a dissent or concurring opinion. Of the eleven
feminist judgments in this book, seven are rewritten majority opinions, three are dissents and one
is a concurrence. Some authors enjoyed the exercise of re-envisioning the original opinion from
the ground up, had they been on the deciding court. Other authors found it easier to react to a
majority opinion with which they disagreed and therefore chose to write a dissent. Of the eleven
rewritten cases in the book, six are Supreme Court decisions, one is a federal circuit court
opinion, and four are Tax Court opinions.
What these feminist tax judgments collectively demonstrate is that incorporating feminist
theories and methods into tax cases is consistent with judicial duties and accepted methods of
interpretation. The cases combat the notion that tax law is a pseudoscientific subdiscipline of

10

economics in which application of the law is foreordained by economic principles or precepts.
Instead, the body of rewritten cases shows that tax law is a product of the larger political, social,
and cultural context in which it operates. Rather than being dictated by the plain language of
statutes or the abstract (and perhaps unknowable) “will” of Congress, tax law decisions are
contingent on the interpretational context brought to bear by the judge and the parties. Seen in
this light, it becomes clear that the history and development of tax law does not follow a linear
path but can take (and could have taken) a multiplicity of different paths.
From a practical perspective, opinion authors were limited to 10,000 words, regardless of
whether they were writing reimagined majority opinions, dissents, or concurrences, as
appropriate to the court. Commentators had the difficult task of explaining, in 4,000 words or
less, what the original court decided, how the feminist judgment differs from the original
judgment, and what practical impact the feminist judgment might have had. Each opinion and
commentary went through at least three rounds of editing with us, and opinion writers and
commentators also shared their thoughts with each other throughout the process. In fact, many
pairs of opinion writers and commentators worked quite closely and cooperatively through the
rounds of editing, with the commentary writers incorporating points in their commentaries at the
request of the opinion writers and with opinion writers receiving comments on their opinions
from the commentary writers. The members of our Advisory Panel also graciously read and gave
comments on each draft opinion, ensuring that the authors received feedback from multiple
sources. The ultimate decision to accept or reject feedback, however, remained with the authors.
There are several cases in the book that, had we been the authors or commentators, we might
have taken a different tack or reached a different conclusion. And in some cases, opinion writers
and commentators saw issues differently. In any event, we did not press authors to reach the
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conclusions we ourselves would have reached or force concordance between opinion writers and
commentators. Instead, we celebrate these multiple viewpoints as consistent with the richness
and complexity of feminist thought.
Organization of Cases and Writing Conventions
The eleven cases in the book span the date range of 1903 to 2013. They implicate a wide
range of issues including gender difference, the basic meaning of equality, medical expense
deductions, marriage, divorce, trusts, income tax filing status, Indian rights, business deductions
and eligibility for tax-exempt status. We considered a variety of different organizational
frameworks for the cases, attempting to group them by common themes or subject matter.
Ultimately, however, because many of the cases involve multiple issues, it was difficult to settle
on any one coherent organizing framework. For that reason, we decided to present the cases in
chronological order. By presenting cases from oldest to most recent, we (hopefully) have
eliminated any of our personal bias in the way we may view the cases and allow readers to
develop their own sense of how the opinions relate to each other and how various courts’ style,
language, and reasoning have evolved over more than a century.
A few words are also in order regarding some of the conventions used in writing the
opinions and commentary included in this volume. In the opinions, for the sake of clarity, we
asked authors to refer to the Internal Revenue Service as either the “IRS” or “Commissioner”
(rather than “petitioner” or “respondent”). We also asked the opinion writers to refer in the text
of their opinions to the Internal Revenue Code for the first time as “Internal Revenue Code § 61”
without reference to a date (which will vary in each case depending upon the tax year or years at
issue). After the first mention, opinion authors were permitted to either refer to the Internal
Revenue Code as “Code § 61” or, where there are repeated references and it is clear from the
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context what they are referring to, simply as “§ 61.” Similarly, we asked opinion authors to refer
in the text of their opinions to the Treasury Regulations as “Treasury Regulations § 1.61-1” for
the first time and, after the first mention, permitted them to refer to the regulations simply as
“Reg. § 1.61-1.” All citations in the opinions follow the “blue pages” rules in The Bluebook
system of citation that are normally used by judges and practitioners.
In the commentary, again for the sake of clarity, we asked authors to refer to the Internal
Revenue Service as the “IRS.” We also asked the commentary writers to refer in the text of their
commentaries to the Internal Revenue Code for the first time as “Code § 61” and, after the first
mention and where it was clear from the context what they were referring to, permitted them to
refer to the Internal Revenue Code simply as “§ 61.” Similarly, we asked commentary authors to
refer to the Treasury Regulations as “Reg. § 1.61-1.” Readers should thus assume that all
references in the commentary to “Code” and “Reg.” refer to the Internal Revenue Code and
Treasury Regulations, respectively. All citations in the commentary follow the regular “rules” in
The Bluebook system of citation that are normally used in law reviews.
Feminist Theories and Methods
A. Formal Equality vs. Substantive Equality
Out of the important sex discrimination cases brought before the Supreme Court in the
1970s emerged what might be called a “formal equality” approach to sex discrimination. Reed v.
Reed,12 decided in 1971, was the first time that the Supreme Court ruled that a law violated
women’s rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. That case involved an
Idaho statute that accorded an automatic preference for a male administrator of a decedent’s
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estate, given two individuals equally related to the decedent. Then-attorney (now Justice) Ruth
Bader Ginsburg wrote the brief on behalf of the Reed plaintiff, successfully arguing that the
Idaho law was unconstitutional. Unfortunately, she did not persuade the Court to apply to gender
discrimination cases the strict scrutiny that applied in racial discrimination cases.13 In Frontiero
v. Richardson,14 Ginsburg was amicus curiae for the plaintiff in a case that challenged the Air
Force’s automatic allocation of spousal benefits to married male service members, but required
married female service members to show that their husbands were dependent on them before
receiving a spousal benefit. Eight of the justices agreed that the Air Force’s policy was
unconstitutional, but they could not agree on the appropriate level of scrutiny under which to
evaluate the law. Thereafter it became likely that gender discrimination claims always would be
subject to “intermediate scrutiny,” not strict scrutiny.
For many feminists, removing formal obstacles to women’s participation in all aspects of
political, social and economic life was the primary goal. Yet others became dissatisfied with this
formal equality approach, and instead sought substantive equality between women and men. The
underlying rationale is that in cases where women and men are not equally situated (e.g.,
pregnancy), treating the sexes the same operates in fact as a form of discrimination against
women, by denying them the care they need.15 This problem is illustrated by the case of
Geduldig v. Aiello, in which the Supreme Court found that the exclusion of pregnancy from the
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California state disability plan did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, on the grounds that
the classification made by California was between “pregnant women and nonpregnant
persons.”16
The debate about formal equality versus substantive equality echoes clearly in two of the
feminist judgments in this book. In her rewrite of the majority opinion in Manufacturer’s
Hanover Trust Co. v. United States,17 Mary Heen considers the use of gender-based mortality
tables in calculating the value of reversionary interests for estate tax purposes. She rejects the use
of gender-specific tables, seeking formal equal treatment for women and men. In contrast, in her
dissent in Clack v. Commissioner,18 Wendy Gerzog closely examines the problems created by a
gender-neutral statute, in regards to the estate tax marital deduction for certain transfers. Gerzog
concludes the opposite of Heen—that is, that gender-neutrality in the estate tax marital deduction
is masquerading as de facto sexism. Thus, Gerzog is primarily concerned with substantive (as
opposed to formal) equality between men and women.
B. Antisubordination/Dominance Feminism
Another significant concern of some feminists is the way that law reinforces power
imbalances. Of differences between men and women, Catharine MacKinnon writes:
[A]n equality question is a question of the distribution of power. Gender is also a
question of power, specifically of male supremacy and female subordination. The
question of equality is at the root a question of hierarchy, which—as power
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succeeds in constructing social perception and social reality—derivatively
becomes a categorical distinction, a difference.”19
Power differences between races, classes, and along other lines also are feminist concerns, as
policies that are neutral on their face can reinforce existing hierarchies and oppressions.20
The feminist judgment written by Danshera Cords in Cheshire v. Commissioner21 is a
reimagined majority Tax Court opinion that grants innocent spouse relief where the original
court did not. Cords’s feminist judgment is deeply informed by a feminist understanding of
power dynamics in intimate relationships. In this way, the Cheshire feminist judgment builds on
the work of feminist theorists like Catharine MacKinnon who expose the way that power
imbalances—particularly, but not exclusively, between men and women—are built into human
relationships and then become entrenched in law and culture.22 By putting the woman at the
center of the analysis, Cords reaches a different opinion about the wife’s income tax liability for
substantial omissions by her husband.
In his rewrite of United States v. Rickert,23 the oldest of the cases included in this volume,
Grant Christensen reaches the same result as the U.S. Supreme Court did in its original opinion,
denying a state’s ability to tax improvements and personal property on Indian land that was held
in trust by the U.S. government for individual Indian allottees. But Christensen importantly
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rejects the Supreme Court’s paternalistic approach in doing so—an approach that was infused
“with its racist and classist assumptions that Indians were uncivilized and incapable of managing
their own affairs, and therefore had to be managed like children, or like women in those days, by
privileged white men who knew better” (to borrow the words of Chloe Thompson in her
excellent and eye-opening commentary on this rewritten opinion). Instead, Christensen honors
and embraces the agency and autonomy of individual Indians and Indian tribes in ways that
protect them from infringement by state and local governments. Rewriting a case without an
obvious link to gender, Christensen (and Thompson in her accompanying commentary) also
show how feminist reasoning and methods can apply outside of cases that directly implicate
gender.
C. Intersectionality, Antiessentialism, and Multiple Identities
One important branch of feminist legal theory that emerged in the 1990s was a critical
focus on “women” as a monolithic category, without recognition of differences of race, class,
immigration status, sexuality, or other significant identity categories. Angela Harris, for example,
writes against what she calls “gender essentialism”—“the notion that there is a monolithic
‘women’s experience’ that can be described independently of other facets of experience like
race, class and sexual orientation.”24 Kimberlé Crenshaw similarly critiques any feminism that
ignores the fact that gender may be only one axis of a woman’s oppression, when in fact
oppression may intersect along the axes of gender and race, for example.25
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In his rewritten concurring opinion in Bob Jones University v. United States,26 David
Brennen demonstrates the power of intersectional analysis. Bob Jones University concerned the
revocation of two educational organizations’ tax-exempt status because they had adopted and
enforced racially discriminatory policies (founded upon what were presumed to be sincerely held
religious beliefs) concerning interracial dating, interracial marriage, and the “mixing of the
races.” The original U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Bob Jones University explored only the
racially discriminatory aspect of these policies and affirmed the denial of tax-exempt status to the
two organizations because the Court found there to be an established public policy against racial
discrimination in education. The original opinion left open the question of whether other forms
of discrimination might similarly result in the revocation of tax-exempt status. Brennen’s opinion
begins to fill that gap by highlighting the differential impact of the schools’ policies on AfricanAmerican women’s freedom of association—with attendant, and potentially harsh, economic
consequences for them. Brennen makes the case that, at the time Bob Jones University was
decided, there was already an established public policy against gender discrimination in
education and that gender discrimination was thus an additional ground for denying tax-exempt
status to these two schools. In his concurrence, Brennen shows how the harms of discrimination
are compounded and can be “especially burdensome” when multiple axes of discrimination
(here, race and gender) intersect.
D. Autonomy and Agency
An emphasis on the ability of women—and all people—to make decisions about their
own bodies is an important feminist commitment. For some feminists, that manifests as a
concern about ability to control whether and when to become pregnant, or resistance to
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government interference with women’s bodies through forced sterilization or forced caesarean
sections.27 It is also a fundamental methodological commitment of many feminists to engage in
what Katharine Bartlett has called “feminist practical reasoning,” which includes taking a broad
approach to the facts of each particular case.28 Two rewritten opinions in this book both
accentuate the autonomy or agency of the taxpayer, in ways that the original opinions did not,
and also provide a factually rich context for the cases. In his rewrite of O’Donnabhain v.
Commissioner,29 which concerned a transgender woman’s ability to deduct costs related to her
gender confirmation surgery as a medical expense, David Cruz takes great care to respect the
taxpayer, Rhiannon O’Donnabhain, as a human being. Cruz puts the issue of respecting
O’Donnabhain front and center by not only using the correct gender and pronouns to refer to her
but also by including an explanation of this move in the text of his decision, rather than
relegating it to a footnote as the original majority Tax Court opinion did. Cruz further humanizes
O’Donnabhain by generally referring to her by name, rather than adopting typical Tax Court
convention that would have dictated referring to her as either “petitioner” or “taxpayer.”
Moreover, Cruz demonstrates sensitivity to the larger implications of labeling O’Donnabhain as
suffering from a “disease,” despite the attraction of doing so as an expeditious means of giving
her and others access to the tax deduction that might bring gender confirmation surgery within
financial reach.
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A similar approach can be found in Jennifer Bird-Pollan’s rewrite of Magdalin v.
Commissioner.30 Bird-Pollan affirms reproductive autonomy by rejecting the prevailing approach
of sharply circumscribing the ability to deduct medical expenses associated with assisted
reproductive technology in a way that effectively limits the deduction to different-sex married
couples suffering from fertility problems. Bird-Pollan instead extends the deduction to all
taxpayers—gay or straight, married or unmarried—by embracing the notion that reproduction is
a function of the bodies of both men and women, whether they are married or not. Bird-Pollan’s
opinion also opens the door to breaking down stereotypical gender roles in parenting by
facilitating reproduction and parenting outside of the different-sex married couple.
E. Women’s Experiences and Intimate Relationships
It is not surprising that much of feminist scholarship is devoted to women’s experience.31
And because women are, in the view of Robin West, “profoundly relational,”32 one subject of
feminist legal analysis is marriage as an organizing principle in private and public life.
Regardless of one’s position on women as more or less “relational” than men, though, marriage
and women’s legal status within marriage has long been a subject of feminist critique.33 In this
volume, the tax consequences of marriage—as well as the questions about the primacy of
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marriage in the administration of the tax system—are key considerations of several of the
included feminist judgments.
In United States v. Davis,34 Patricia Cain’s feminist dissent takes on the Supreme Court’s
outdated view of marriage and takes a position that would ultimately become the law in 1984,
recognizing that divorcing couples often have functioned as a single economic unit, not as arm’slength bargainers. In Ann Murphy’s dissent in Lucas v. Earl,35 she, too, takes on marriage, but in
a slightly different way than Cain does. Murphy would force the tax law to recognize the validity
of the income-splitting arrangement entered into by a married couple, emphasizing that the wife
is an equal (if not superior) financial partner to the marriage.
Ruthann Robson approaches marriage from a different vantage point in her rewrite of the
landmark decision in United States v. Windsor,36 which overturned section three of the federal
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and required the federal government to legally recognize
same-sex marriage for the first time. In reaching the same decision as the majority in Windsor,
Robson draws on the narrative feminist method by focusing on the lives and lived experiences of
the lesbian couple at the center of the tax controversy (rather than approaching DOMA’s impact
on same-sex couples at a more general or abstract level). But even in the context of telling the
extraordinary story of these two women’s lives and affirming the legal recognition of their
relationship, Robson actively resists and calls for the overturning of the entrenched privileging of
marriage in tax law and the recognition of a wider array of human relationships.
These judgments relating to marriage are informed by a focus on women’s experience
and consideration of how the law reproduces patterns of dominance of men over women, two
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classic moves in feminist legal theory.37 As Cain herself has previously written, “legal
scholarship is not feminist unless it is grounded in women’s experience.”38 The opinions in
Davis, Lucas, and Windsor live up to that definition.
F. Uncovering Implicit Male Bias
Martha Chamallas has identified uncovering implicit bias and male norms in the law as
one of the “opening moves” of feminist theory.39 Chamallas is referring here to a commitment to
uncovering the way that laws that appear neutral on their face are actually based on and embody
male experiences or male ideals. Making this very move, the feminist judgment written by Mary
Louise Fellows in Welch v. Helvering40 revisits the classic question broached in every basic
income tax course regarding what constitutes a deductible “ordinary and necessary” business
expense. In that rewritten Supreme Court majority opinion, Fellows questions the extent to
which one’s conception of the business world is based on a male model of doing business.
Fellows’s reimagined feminist majority opinion sharply departs from the approach taken
in Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s iconic original opinion by drawing upon feminist practical
reasoning, a method also adopted by David Cruz in O’Donnabhain and Jennifer Bird-Pollan in
Magdalin, as noted above.41 Fellows refuses to approach the question of deductibility abstractly
and instead takes a more contextualized approach to determining whether an expense is ordinary
and necessary. She dives into the facts presented to the Court and demands more—to the point of
not actually rendering a decision in the case before the Court but rather sending the case back to
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the lower court for further fact finding that will facilitate a more nuanced and individualized
decision of the question. In providing guidance to the lower courts on remand, Fellows also
breaks with convention in her opinion by drawing liberally from literature (in particular, Mary
Shelley’s Frankenstein) to support her dismantling of the public/private hierarchy that is implicit
in the allowance of a deduction for business expenses and the general disallowance of deductions
for personal expenses. Fellows also draws on outsider perspectives to inform her interpretation of
the phrase “ordinary and necessary” in order to open the way to innovation in business at a time
of severe economic crisis while simultaneously avoiding the reinforcement of, and provision of
tangible financial support to, businessmen’s already privileged lives (along lines not only of
gender but also of race, class, etc.)
G. Additional Resources
In describing some of the feminist theories and methods that writers of these feminist
judgments employ, we have detailed only a small number of the multiple perspectives, concerns,
and methods that comprise the rich field that is feminist legal theory. We have not mentioned
socialist feminism,42 postmodern feminism,43 third-wave feminism,44 pragmatic feminism,45
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queer theory,46 or cultural feminism,47 to name just a few other perspectives. For those who want
to learn more about feminist legal theory generally, we recommend Martha Chamallas’s book,
Introduction of Feminist Legal Theory.48 For those curious about feminist legal theory as applied
to feminist judgments in particular, the first two chapters of Feminist Judgments: Rewritten
Opinions of the United States Supreme Court provide a great deal of background and context.49
Conclusion
The opinions and commentaries in this book reveal three important claims. First, tax law
is political. Second, statutes are just as subject to interpretation as constitutional provisions. And
third, incorporating feminist methods or theories into the interpretive process of judicial decision
making can lead to results that may (or may not) vary from a decision that does not incorporate
that perspective. Yet, as the rewritten opinions in this volume make clear, a feminist lens almost
always leads to different reasoning and emphasis in a judicial opinion. It is thus important that
the judiciary includes individuals with a variety of perspectives, including feminist ones. As the
contributors to this volume demonstrate, both men and women can have feminist perspectives. In
that sense, this volume should not be reduced to an argument for more women on the bench—
although gender diversity is most certainly a desired goal for other reasons—because a judiciary
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that looks more like all of the citizens that it serves will increase public confidence in the
integrity of the system.50
By showing how perspective makes a difference in judicial decision making in tax cases
in particular, we hope to illustrate to students, fellow academics, lawyers, and judges that there
are many areas where the selected mode of analysis—in this case, feminism—can be just as
important as legislative history and statutory language to the outcome of the case. We imagine
that this book might be a useful tool in law school courses that focus on statutory interpretation
or substantive tax law. Beyond the classroom, we hope that the text makes a substantive and
practical contribution to critical tax theory by demonstrating that a focus on historically
subordinated groups makes a difference in outcome. As we have argued previously, “a complete
study of tax law and policy requires an understanding of the historical, social, political, and
cultural contexts in which the tax laws operate.”51 To that list, we add that a robust understanding
of tax law also requires an understanding of the perspective of the deciding judges, and that a
feminist perspective tends to lead to outcomes that take seriously the issues, concerns, and
experiences of traditionally disempowered people, with an emphasis on achieving and furthering
the cause of social justice.
For feminists without significant tax backgrounds, we invite you to read this book to
understand just how important the tax system is in achieving a fairer, more equal, and more
inclusive society. For tax experts without familiarity with feminist theory, we invite you to
consider how fundamental principles like gender equality can be incorporated into almost any
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tax analysis. For those who are experts in both feminist legal theory and taxation, welcome
home.
This volume represents a collaboration among more than thirty individuals. As an
academic collaboration, the book is itself a feminist exercise in bringing multiple voices together
to push the boundaries of our understanding and inspire new ways of thinking. We hope you are
as stimulated by this book as we are. Enjoy!
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